# Cyber and Information Threats in the Age of AI





Image generated by ChatGPT

Broad term that encompasses all fields of computer science that enable machines to accomplish tasks that would normally require human intelligence.

A subdiscipline of AI focused on creating machine learning (ML) algorithms that can learn from data. After training, ML algorithms can make predictions or decisions about new data.

Large language models (LLMs) use machine learning to perform natural language processing tasks, including to understand, summarise, generate, and predict new content.

Generative AI is a type of ML that uses LLMs to create new data/content.

# AI will change the business landscape.

Around 42% of businesses already use AI in their business operations.

GenAI

### By 2026

ML

GenAI will automate 60% of the design effort for new websites and apps.

LLM

>100 million humans will engage robo-colleagues during their work.

By 2027

15% of new applications will be automatically generated by AI, without a human in the loop.



### Global investment in military AI is projected to increase.

USD 9 billion

2023

USD 39 billion

### 2028

According to an RSIS report, potential AI investment areas include:

- (a) Development of military weaponry with specialised AI chips and capabilities
- (b) Development of software to process big data
- (c) Development of combat systems with self-regulation, self-control and self-actuation capabilities
- (d) Integration with Robotic Ground Platforms and Robotic Surgical Platforms

## AI capabilities can help achieve battlefield superiority.

AI

Fast, precise and resilient kill chains-

Battlefield awareness

**Resilient sustainment support** 

Adaptive force planning and application

Efficient enterprise business operations

### But, AI also amplifies the creation and spread of harmful content.



Europe also experienced a 780% increase deepfake attacks.

From 2022 to 2023, the number of deepfakes increased 10 times.

### In the Israel-Hamas conflict:

Al-generated content by Hamas featured children next to rubble, as victims of alleged Israeli attacks; these appeared to be intended for European and United States audiences.

Al-generated content by Israel featured large crowds waving Israeli flags and deepfake videos of celebrities expressing support for Israel; these were usually intended for domestic Israeli audiences.

In both instances, Al-generated content was used to SWay public opinion about the Israel-Hamas conflict.



# AI can also be used to generate deepfake impersonations of leaders.

### In the Russia-Ukraine War:

A deepfake video of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy purportedly telling his soldiers to surrender was circulated.

On the Russian social media platform Vkontakte, a deepfake video showed then-General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, appearing to criticise President Zelenskyy.

Here, deepfakes could negatively impact soldier morale.

### In particular:

# Social media platforms have significant AI-generated output.

On X:

1140 accounts were using ChatGPT to generate content that aimed at promoting suspicious websites and spreading harmful content. These accounts formed a social network by following and retweeting each other to increase the virality of their content.

# On Telegram:

400-500 channels were providing deepfake services which ranged from USD 2 to USD 100, making it remarkably economical to commission deepfakes.

### In addition, AI can optimise spear phishing and cyber attacks.

Personally identifiable information obtained through social engineering could be fed into GenAl tools to create spear phishing emails that seem genuine.



Military personnel who fall prey to such spear phishing emails might reveal sensitive information, that can be used in future cyber or physical operations.



GenAI could also be used to generate polymorphic malware that could mutate itself to avoid being detected by Endpoint Detection and Response

systems.



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Hence, threat actors can launch sophisticated cyber attacks faster, at a lower cost, and with less know-how.

Cyber defenders of military systems will face a more complex threat landscape, comprising state and non-state-sponsored actors who are able to pose a credible threat to cyber defence systems.



### AI also has inherent vulnerabilities.

### Prompt injection:

In 2023, a Stanford University student was able to get Microsoft's Bing Chat to reveal its programming and how it works.



In the defence context, if an LLM is not adequately protected, malicious actors could exfiltrate sensitive classified information from the LLM's memory.

# Data poisoning:

Threat actors can manipulate LLM output by feeding the LLM with manipulated, or poisoned, data.

Military decision support systems fed with poisoned data might exhibit impaired decision making. This could affect battlefield awareness, or even lead to civilian harm. For example, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers showed that fake radar images could be injected into maritime navigational systems, resulting in the generation of fake targets, or concealment of actual targets, on the navy ship's radar.

### No ships spotted!





# Finally, AI awareness adds to the phenomenon of Liar's Dividend.

# During the 2024 United States Presidential Campaign:

Some social media posts falsely claimed that the crowds at Kamala Harris' Detroit rally on 7 Aug 2024 were fake and had been added using AI.

Hany Farid, a professor at the University of Carolina, Berkeley's School of Information, and several fact-checking websites including NPR, Reuters and BBC later dispelled these false claims and confirmed that the crowds at Harris' rally were real.

In a phenomenon known as Liar's Dividend, the public's increased awareness about deepfakes could be used by malicious actors to put forth more persuasive false claims that content is fake or Al-generated, and thus real

manipulate public perception for their own



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Chuck Callesto 🗹 huckCallesto

crowd photo at campaign rally stop..

Post



2:47 AM · Aug 11, 2024 · 14.8M Views

29.4K Reposts

agendas.





1,948 Quotes 106.2K Likes 5,318 Bookmarks





National international and regulations and norms to promote the responsible use of AI.



Whole-of-Society multi-stakeholder task forces to coordinate efforts across different ministries and sectors.



Utilise a suite of different detection tools, instead of developing a single perfect tool, to counter the diverse risks of AI in a more comprehensive and reliable way.

**Education** 

Education in critical thinking to ensure civilians and military personnel are less susceptible to AI-generated content such as deepfakes.



### **Task Forces**



### <u>A Product of:</u> **ADMM Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence (ACICE)**

Reference: Research by the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS

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